Steven B Bashaw PC

Add to Favorites

Attorneys, Accident & Property Damage Attorneys, Adoption Law Attorneys

Be the first to review!

CLOSED NOW

Tomorrow: 9:00 am - 5:00 pm

23 Years

in Business

(630) 322-9990Visit WebsiteMap & Directions1500 Eisenhower Ln Ste 800Lisle, IL 60532 Write a Review

Is this your business?

Customize this page.

Claim This Business

Hours

Regular Hours

Mon - Fri:	9:00 am - 5:00 pm

Places Near Lisle with Attorneys

Westmont (9 miles)
Wheaton (9 miles)
Downers Grove (9 miles)
Bolingbrook (10 miles)
Glen Ellyn (10 miles)
Naperville (10 miles)
Lombard (12 miles)
Hinsdale (12 miles)
Oak Brook (14 miles)
Carol Stream (15 miles)

More Types of Legal Services in Lisle

Immigration Law Attorneys Traffic Law Attorneys General Practice Attorneys Paralegals Bankruptcy Law Attorneys Process Servers Family Law Attorneys Criminal Law Attorneys Child Custody Attorneys Attorneys Real Estate Attorneys Bail Bonds Tax Attorneys Legal Clinics Divorce Attorneys

More Info

AKA

Bashaw Steven B

Bashaw Steven B PC

Other Links

http://www.bashawlaw.com

https://lislechamber.com/list/member/steven-b-bashaw-p-c-lisle-671

Categories

Gallery

Be the first to add a photo!

Reviews

Hi there!
Be the first to review!

Click to Rate

Details

Phone: (630) 322-9990

Address: 1500 Eisenhower Ln Ste 800, Lisle, IL 60532

Website: http://www.bashawlaw.com

People Also Viewed

View similar Attorneys

Suggest an Edit

Steven B Bashaw PC

Divorce
Adoption

Fraud
St Dist., March 2002), http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2002/1stDistrict/March/Html/1012982.htm. The basis for her cause of action was alleged to be the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, (i.e., a pattern and practice of charging consumers undisclosed fees), and breach of contract. Washington Mutual filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Section 2-619, contending that the Home Owners Loan Act of 1993, (12 USC Section 1461) expressly preempts stat law relating to regulated loan-related fees and charges. Noting that HOLA specifically authorizes the Office of Thrift Supervision to issue regulations of federal savings associations, and that this effectively preempts state law, the Court found the provisions of regulation of loan-related fees excluded the applicability of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The OTS addressed this issue in two opinion letters relating to California and New York law. In California, the OTS concluded that demand statement fees are loan-related and state regulation is preempted. In New York, the OTS concluded that a state law requiring that an association must provide an initial payoff letter with out charge and may not charge more than twenty dollars for each subsequent letter was also preempted as a loan-related fee. Accordingly, in the Noskowitz case, the First District holds that "federal law preempts the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to the extent it is used to regulate an association’s imposition of payoff statement fees." The Plaintiff’s argument that her cause of action for breach of contract should not have been dismissed inasmuch as the OTS regulations state that contract law is "not preempted to the extent that it only incidentally affects the lending operations of Federal savings associations…" was also rejected. The breach of contract cause is predicated on the alleged failure to disclose in the mortgage agreement that a release fee would be charged. The effect of a ruling in her favor would be to impose a mandate of disclosure of such fees in a federally regulated transaction based on state contract law. The OTS describes the payoff statement as "an integral part of the lending process" regulated and preempted by federal law, which is not to be circumvented by the application of state contract law.
Theft
Assault
Restraining Order
The bidders obtained a temporary restraining order preventing enforcement of the rule from the trial court, and the First District reversed, finding that implied in the authority to conduct the sales is the ability to promulgate rules for the conduct of the sales that are congruent with the legislative purpose.
Forgery
On appeal, the Second District opinion by Justice Callum presents a great deal of law succinctly and with unusual clarity, affirming the trial court. Turning first to actual authority, the case restates the law that a' catchall' provision in a power will not expand powers otherwise expressly limited in the document and will be "disregarded as meaningless verbiage". The law in Illinois is that a general grant of agency does not include the power to execute a contract of guaranty unless specifically granted. There was no express grant of authority to Kristopher in the power, (in fact, Conley gave the authority to guaranty trust assets to the trustee), and the facts indicated that there was no intent to give implied authority to sign a guaranty. Noting that "only the words and conduct of the alleged principal, not the alleged agent, establish the agent's authority", there was no finding of conduct by Conley that would support apparent authority to sign the guaranty. The Bank also argued that it relied in good faith upon the power of attorney and therefore should be "fully protected" as provided by the Power of Attorney Act, (755 ILCS 45/2-8). Noting that the legislature amended the Act in1997 following the decision In re Estate of Davis, 260 Ill.App.3d 252, (holding that a bank could not rely in good faith on a forged power), to provide that good faith reliance may be upon a document "purporting to establish an agency", Justice Callum nonetheless distinguishes the Conley power. This power was not a forgery, nor was it a fraud. It simply did not purport to give the power to execute a guaranty, and therefore there was no basis for the bank to make a good faith reliance claim because there was no stated authority to rely upon. The argument that there was ratification was also rejected. The ratification must be that of the principal. Here, the argument that the Trustee ratified was misplaced because the ratification argued was that of the Grand Premier and not the principal, Conley. "Only a principal can ratify this agent's actions."
Internet Crimes

Business and Corporate Law

Business Transactions
Mr. Bashaw will present the case law update at the 1st Annual Real Estate Institute being sponsored by the Illinois Institute of Continuing Legal Education. This is the opening session of a two-day conference designed to bring real estate attorneys the leading edge of developments in residential and commercial transactions, landlord/tenant law, real estate development, and real estate litigation. The conference program will be held at the Hyatt Lodge at the McDonald's Campus in Oak Brook, Illinois. (click here for materials)
Construction Contracts
The most interesting aspect of this decision, (for non-personal-injury lawyers), is the question presented by the fact that the contract between the owner/developer and contractor specifically sets forth that the contractor was responsible for taking safety precautions on the job site to prevent accidents. While Illinois does hold that a party to a contract may be liable for injury to a third party to whom he otherwise owes no duty by undertaking to protect such a third party in a contract, the theory of "voluntary undertaking" is narrowly construed by public policy. Here the contractor did not undertake any greater duty toward Frank than the owner would have had to the child as a trespasser injured by an open and obvious danger. "To so hold might inhibit parties who enter in to construction contracts from clearly spelling out their responsibilities in contracts." The contractor owned no duty to Frank based on its contractual duties and was not liable under the theory of voluntary undertaking.
Antitrust

Severance Agreement

Real Estate Litigation
Steve has presented the case law updates annually for the Illinois State Bar Association, various local bar associations for a number of years, and contributes to the Real Estate Law Flashpoints for the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education website, and at http://www.bashawlaw.com. His annual case law update of real estate decisions in Illinois has been published in the Southern Illinois University Law Journal and are published annually by the Illinois State Bar Association Real Estate Section Council.
Premises Liability
Most real estate lawyers represent at least one builder or developer. Invariably, the question of the nature and extent of liability to children injured on a construction site comes up in discussion. In the recent case of Jakubowski v. Alden-Bennet Construction Company, (1st Dist., January 11, 2002), http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2002/1stDistrict/January/Html/1004030.htm, the duty and liability of a landowner and contractor for injury to a minor child trespassing on a construction site are reviewed-- and refined relating to the principal of a duty by voluntary undertaking. The injured minor, Frank, was 13 years old and lived across the street from the construction site. He had been seen on the site before the accident and told by the contractor, his parents and the policy not go on to the property. One evening, after dark, Frank was walking around on the newly added second floor when he thought he saw a police car. In his haste to duck out of sight, he fell through an open stairway to the first floor.
Construction Litigation
There are two different statute of limitation provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure that can possibly relate to the filing of an action based upon a construction contract.
Real Estate Transactions
In addition to encouragement from the Illinois Institute of Continuing Legal Education and the Illinois State Bar Association’s Real Estate Section Council, it should be noted that Chicago Title Insurance Company helps underwrite the production of these real estate case law updates. Chicago Title is committed to the role of attorneys in real estate transactions and their continuing education in this area. Its staff attorneys are pleased to offer their view points on various developments in the law as set forth below from the perspective of a title company serving the public and the attorneys who represent their clients in real estate transactions.
Eminent Domain
"In eminent domain cases, the only question for the jury to decide is the just compensation owed to the owner of the property to be condemned." So begins the decision in City of Quincy v. Diamond Construction Company, (4th Dist., January 16, 2002), http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2002/4thDistrict/January/Html/4010328.htm where the issue was whether a second appraisal obtained by the City could should have been excluded by the trial court based on a motion in limine. The City of Quincy first indicated its intent to condemn the asphalt plant owned by Diamond Construction Company as part of its plan to extend 18th Street in September 1997. The taking would divide the property into two separate parcels, and the remaining property could not be used as an asphalt plant thereafter. Diamond, concerned that it would be required to move during the regular construction season, began communicating with the City on a regular basis to determine how to best accomplish its relocation. Two years later, in December 1999, Diamond received a letter offer of $462,000 from the City. The City had an appraisal of the entire parcel at $1,300,000, which indicated that the highest and best use of the property was as an asphalt plant, and that after division into two separate parcels, the property would no longer be suitable for that use. Diamond began the relocation process in order to survive the move and determined that it would take approximately one year to obtain machinery and set up a new plant. Throughout the winter, Diamond attempted to negotiate reimbursement for its relocation expenses and a low-interest loan from the City to no avail. On April5, 2000, Diamond formally rejected the City's offer of $462,000.
Easement
Land Use and Zoning
This site contains over 4,000 pages of material produced by the Land Use Law Center written for both community leaders and experienced land use practitioners.
Landlord-Tenant Disputes
The Appellate Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the landlord, finding that there were material issues of fact. Of interest in the decision is the discussion of the effect of the exercise of the option to purchase. The option, when exercised according to its terms, extinguished the lease and transformed the parties’ relationship from landlord-tenant to vendor-vendee. The rights of the parties are thereafter determined according to the terms of the option. The purchaser must exercise the option strictly in conformity with the terms, and failure to do so continues the landlord-tenant relationship. The proper termination of the lease by the landlord, however, extinguishes the option. Accordingly, the factual issue of whether the option was properly exercised by the deposit of funds into escrow prior to the termination of the lease was sufficient to require remand. (Because the lease was not drafted to require compliance with the terms of the lease as a condition to exercise the option, the tenant’s alleged default prior to the exercise of the option did not effect its right to purchase since no default had been declared – interesting drafting issue, eh?) There were also factual issues relating to whether the breach was material or had been waived, and the Court notes that "In the context of lessor-lessee relationships, our supreme court has stated ‘it has long been established that any act of a landlord which affirms the existence of a lease and recognizes a tenant as his lessee after the landlord has knowledge of a breach of lease results in the landlord’s waiving his right to forfeiture of the lease." Here, the record indicated that landlord knew of the sub tenancy six years before the declaration of a default and continuously accepted monthly rent. Whether this conduct amounted to a waiver was an issue of fact.
Property Damage
Th Dist., 6/28/2002), http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2002/4thDistrict/June/Html/4010591.htm, the Court was confronted with a suit by the Landlord against the Tenant to recover for property damage in an apartment caused by the tenant’s negligence in handling a lit candle or oil lamp that resulted in a fire. The lease was drafted by the landlord for a three month period and specifically included a "yield-back" provision that the tenant was to keep the apartment in good order and repair and yield up the premises in good condition and repair, ordinary wear and tear excepted. The lease also provided the tenant would be responsible for any damage except as is caused by normal wear and tear. There was no specific provision for responsibility in the event of damage by fire during the term of the lease. When the fire occurred, the Landlord filed suit for $671,463.95, alleging that the Tenant acted negligently and was responsible under the lease terms. The Tenant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the intent of the parties under the lease was that the Landlord would maintain fire insurance upon the premises and should be limited to recovery under the policy. The Fourth district affirmed the dismissal and finding by the trial court that the Tenant was a co-insured under the Landlord’s policy and the Landlord failed to state a cause of action.
Condominium Law
The Defendants, however, contended that they only needed a two-thirds vote based on the statutory provision of the Condominium Law, (765 ILCS 605/27(b)(2), for correcting “scrivener’s errors” in condominium declarations.

Personal Injury
St Dist., May 24, 2001), http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2001/1stDistrict/May/Html/1002314.htm is a case that appeals primarily to personal injury and insurance defense lawyers because of the intricacy of its duty to defend, indemnification, and coverage issues.
Disability Discrimination
A person is disabled under the ADA if they have a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Mrs. Dadian’s osteoporosis is a degenerative disease which substantially limits here ability to walk and therefore qualifies. A public entity is required to make reasonable accommodations to a person with a disability by altering rules, policies, practices or availability of services when necessary under the ADA, and whether a requested accommodation is reasonable is "highly fact-specific, and determined on a case-by-case basis by balancing the cost to the defendant and the benefit to the plaintiff.", and a "showing that the desired accommodation will affirmatively enhance a disabled plaintiff’s quality of life by ameliorating the effects of the disability." In this case, the jury determined that the "cost" to the Village of granting the front driveway permit was out-weighed by the needs of Mrs. Dadian, and that the request was not at odds with the purpose behind the ordinance or cause a fundamental or unreasonable impact I the neighborhood. The Court also noted that the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 3601, places the burden of proof on the public entity to prove that a direct threat exists to the health or public safety as a defense to a disability discrimination action.

Trusts and Estates

Estate Planning
St Dist., March 23, 2001), http://www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2001/3rdDistrict/April/Html/3000283.htm, the imposition of a resulting trust was attempted to avoid the impact of a partition suit brought against Kathleen by a creditor of her husband, (attorney John Sullivan, who was disbarred and had a sizable judgment against him as a result of conversion of client’s funds in his trust and estates practice). The Sullivan’s purchased their residence in Wilmette in 1972 for $58,000.00; with a mortgage of $22,000.00 plus $36,000.00 received from Kathleen’s father. In 1996, Judgment Services obtained a sheriff’s deed conveying John’s interest in the property to them.
Wills
Trusts
Power of Attorney
Nd Dist., November 14, 2001), http://state.il.us/court/opinions/AppellateCourt/2001/2ndDistrict/November/Html/2001462.htm. We both agree that this is an extraordinarily important case. Dick sees it from the title company’s perspective, and last month discussed the implications the case has for him reviewing powers of attorney at transaction closings with the ultimate goal of insuring title. I see it as a case attorneys must understand and know about whenever they deal with guaranty and authority issues.
Probate

Bankruptcy
Foreclosure
Bankruptcy, particularly the filing of a Chapter 13 Petition, is more frequently becoming the "defense of choice" to mortgage foreclosure litigation. The very brief and pointed decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eight Circuit of In Re Gene E. Dudley, Sr., (8
Tax Law
Debt Collection
Updating the Business of the Practice of Law; Another Fair Debt Collection Safe Harbor, Partition Suit to be Reviewed, and Intercounty Title Company

View All Services

Provided by